Summary of Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India

In the background of the current terrorist attacks in Indian Occupied Kashmir and the tensions arising between India and Pakistan, a thorough, impartial investigation must be carried out to find out those who were responsible.

There have been previous accusations in India that terrorist incidents and charges have been manipulated, allegedly by Indian intelligence, and Hindutva involvement downplayed for political gain. A summary of one of the more serious pieces of work by a former Inspector General of Police is presented below for all those interested in this critical area. All too often, such attacks are used by the Indian State to clamp down on Muslims and Hindutva activists to wage mass violence against India and Kashmir’s Muslim population.

Note: This is an AI detailed summary of Who Killed Karkare? by S.M. Mushrif, focusing on the main arguments, key evidence, and critical events and chapters.

Summary of Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India

Introduction

Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India is a controversial book by S.M. Mushrif, a former Inspector General of Police in Maharashtra, published in late 2009 en.wikipedia.org. The book presents an alternative narrative about terrorism in India, challenging the mainstream portrayal of “Islamic terror” and pointing to the role of Hindutva (right-wing Hindu extremist) forces. Mushrif draws on his police background, various investigative reports, and media accounts to argue that much of what is labelled Islamic terrorism in India is orchestrated or misattributed, with India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Hindu extremist networks playing a hidden role, punemirror.com, indiatoday.in. The assassination of Hemant Karkare, the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief, killed during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, is the central thread of the book’s narrative, which Mushrif alleges was not a simple act of Pakistani terrorists but part of a larger conspiracy “to eliminate” Karkare and derail his investigations, timesofindia.indiatimes.com, punemirror.com. Below is a comprehensive look at the book’s main arguments, the evidence cited, the account of Karkare’s death, critiques of media and law enforcement, case studies examined, and the impact and reception of Mushrif’s work.

Main Arguments: Terrorism Narratives and Hindutva’s Role

Mushrif’s core argument is that the “real face of terrorism in India” is very different from the official narrative. He asserts that since Independence, India’s Intelligence Bureau has systematically “created false propaganda” about Islamic terrorism while ignoring or concealing the violence of Hindu extremists books.google.com indiatoday.in. According to the book, a network of Hindutva hardliners – which Mushrif often terms “Brahminists” to denote proponents of an extremist Hindu supremacist ideology – has been responsible for many terror incidents wrongly blamed on Muslim groups punemirror.com punemirror.com. The author contends that “Muslim terrorism in India is a figment of imagination, a facade created by the IB to cover up the real terrorism… perpetrated by Brahminists to establish Brahminist hegemony” punemirror.com. In Mushrif’s analysis, Hindu extremist organizations (including cadres affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, RSS) adopted a new strategy in the 2000s: bombing cities and public places (often targeting Muslim communities or symbols) to incite communal fear, instead of only instigating riots as in earlier decades himalmag.com punemirror.com.

A major claim of the book is that India’s intelligence and investigative agencies have been infiltrated or influenced by these extremist elements, resulting in a biased terror narrative. Mushrif alleges that IB officers sympathetic to Hindutva causes have deliberately misled police investigations to pin blame on Muslims while letting Hindu terror networks operate with impunity punemirror.com hindustantimes.com. He cites the consistent focus on “Islamic terror” in official discourse, whereas incidents pointing to Hindutva involvement were downplayed or quickly forgotten. The author labels the RSS “India’s No.1 terror organisation”, pointing out that numerous charge-sheets (at least 18, by his count) have been filed linking RSS or its affiliates (like Abhinav Bharat and Bajrang Dal) to bomb blasts hindustantimes.com hindustantimes.com. In Mushrif’s view, the goal of these extremist plots is twofold: to frame Muslims as terrorists (fueling public support for a Hindu nationalist agenda) and ultimately to destabilise India’s secular order in pursuit of a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nation) punemirror.com punemirror.com.

In summary, Who Killed Karkare? argues that many high-profile terror attacks in India were either orchestrated by Hindutva militants or cynically exploited by them, with the connivance of elements within the intelligence community. The public’s perception of terrorism has thus been manipulated – painting Muslims as culprits while the “real” culprits among Hindu extremist ranks remain hidden punemirror.com punemirror.com. This sweeping claim sets the stage for Mushrif’s examination of specific incidents and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of Hemant Karkare.

Key Evidence and Case Studies Supporting the Claims

Mushrif bolsters his claims with a range of evidence, including police investigations, court records, media reports, and inconsistencies in official accounts. Some of the key pieces of evidence and case studies discussed in the book are:

Malegaon Blasts (2006 & 2008): The book highlights the Malegaon bombings as a turning point. The September 2006 Malegaon blasts (which killed dozens outside a mosque) were initially attributed to Islamist groups; however, Mushrif notes that subsequent probes hinted at Hindu extremist involvement timesofindia.indiatimes.com. In 2008, another blast hit Malegaon, and ATS chief Hemant Karkare’s investigation uncovered an alleged Hindutva plot – arresting individuals like Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, and others linked to a radical outfit Abhinav Bharat en.wikipedia.org. This was “the first time Hindutva organisations [were] identified as being responsible for terrorism in India”, a phenomenon later termed “saffron terror” en.wikipedia.org. Mushrif uses this case to show that Hindu radicals were actively planting bombs, and he argues that the Intelligence Bureau was unhappy with Karkare’s revelations. He claims the IB conspired to replace Karkare with a more pliant officer to “thwart investigations against the Hindu hardliners” involved in Malegaon timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Indeed, Mushrif alleges that the IB helped bring back K.P. Raghuvanshi (whom he labels a communal officer) as ATS chief specifically to derail the Malegaon probe and protect “big names” in the Hindu terror network timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
Nanded Blast (2006): Mushrif gives special importance to an April 2006 incident in Nanded, Maharashtra, where a bomb accidentally exploded in the house of an RSS activist, killing two individuals assembling the device punemirror.com punemirror.com. The perpetrators, found with fake beards and Muslim outfits, were evidently planning an attack to frame Muslims. This incident, documented by the police, is cited as hard evidence of a Hindutva terror module. Mushrif recounts that discovering the Nanded case in 2006 (shortly after his retirement) alerted him to a “nationwide terror plot” by “Brahminists” punemirror.com. He underscores that such events were largely ignored by the IB and downplayed in the national media, reinforcing his thesis of a cover-up.
Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid, and Ajmer Sharif Blasts (2007): While the book’s primary focus is on Maharashtra-centric cases, it also examines major incidents outside the state. The Samjhauta Express bombing (February 2007) – a blast on a train between India and Pakistan that killed 68 people – was initially blamed on Islamic militants. Mushrif points to later findings (eventually, investigators arrested a Hindu extremist, Swami Aseemanand, and others in this case) to argue that Hindutva groups were behind it and that investigators had missed or suppressed this angle for years. Similarly, the Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad (May 2007) and the Ajmer Dargah blast (October 2007) are discussed; both attacks targeted Muslim congregations and were first ascribed to Islamist terror. Mushrif notes that in each case, subsequent probes or confessions indicated involvement of RSS-inspired militants, confirming the pattern he alleges frontierweekly.com frontierweekly.com. For example, by 2010, Aseemanand’s confession linked a common Hindu extremist network to Samjhauta, Mecca Masjid, Ajmer, and Malegaon. Mushrif’s book, written in 2009, anticipated this connection, calling these incidents part of a “chain of blasts” by Hindutva elements while authorities looked the other way” frontierweekly.com.
Bomb-Making Accidents and Arms Caches: Apart from major terror attacks, the book catalogs several smaller but telling incidents: e.g., the 2008 Kanpur blast where two Bajrang Dal members died while building bombs, and discoveries of explosives linked to right-wing groups in other states. Mushrif treats these cases as the “smoking gun” evidence of an extensive underground extremist network. He contrasts the swift arrests and harsh measures applied to Muslim suspects in other cases with the relative impunity enjoyed by the Hindu extremist suspects (many of whom were not pursued aggressively after initial news reports) frontierweekly.com frontierweekly.com.
Investigative Reports and Public Records: Mushrif buttresses his narrative by citing findings from official reports and court proceedings when available. For instance, he discusses the confession of an Army officer (Lt. Col. Purohit) accused in the Malegaon conspiracy, who allegedly admitted to supplying military-grade explosives (RDX) to a Hindu terror cell. He also references the eventual chargesheets filed by the Anti-Terror Squad or CBI/NIA in various cases, which named members of RSS or affiliated groups – thereby validating his claims that Hindu nationalist extremists had been deeply involved in terrorism hindustantimes.com. Mushrif’s use of “public records” is selective, as he openly relies heavily on press reports. In defense of this approach, he argues that he drew from “reputed national dailies” and that if those reports were false, the onus was on authorities to prosecute the sources rather than dismiss his questions indiatoday.in. In fact, Mushrif describes his method as a “systematic analysis of newspaper reports” on 11 terror incidents since 2005, which he cross-compared to identify contradictions and cover-ups punemirror.com. This meta-analysis of open-source information, he contends, revealed a consistent pattern pointing to insider complicity rather than mere investigative lapses.

Through these case studies and evidence, Who Killed Karkare? builds a far-reaching conspiracy theory: a “nationwide terror plot” by Hindutva militants has been unfolding under the radar, with tacit help from elements within India’s security establishment punemirror.com. Mushrif believes that Hemant Karkare stumbled upon this truth during his 2008 investigation – and that discovery ultimately cost him his life.

Hemant Karkare’s Death: Circumstances and Conspiracy Allegations

At the heart of the book is the dramatic claim embedded in its very title: Who killed Karkare? Mushrif argues that ATS Chief Hemant Karkare’s death on 26 November 2008 (during the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack) was not a straightforward case of being killed by Pakistani terrorists, but rather the result of a conspiracy by domestic forces. According to Mushrif, Karkare was assassinated by a cabal of Hindutva extremists in league with operatives in the Intelligence Bureau who wanted to silence him and halt his ongoing investigations timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com.

Official Version vs. Mushrif’s Theory: Officially, Karkare and two fellow officers (Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar) died in a shootout with Pakistani gunmen who ambushed their police vehicle near Cama Hospital during the Mumbai siege en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Mushrif does not dispute that Pakistani terrorists carried out the general 26/11 attack, but he splits the event into two parallel operations: one by the ten Lashkar-e-Taiba militants who struck the hotels and other sites, and another “local” operation targeted specifically at Karkare’s team punemirror.com. He writes that “the terrorists who caused the bloodbath at CST, Cama Hospital and Rangbhavan Lane were not among those who came from Pakistan, but were local terrorists” punemirror.com. In Mushrif’s reconstruction, only 8 Pakistani attackers actually landed in Mumbai by boat, and they hit the Taj, Oberoi-Trident, Leopold Café, and Nariman House punemirror.com. The CST station and Cama Hospital attackers, he claims, were Indian nationals (Hindutva extremists) carrying out a pre-planned hit on Karkare under cover of the chaos punemirror.com. He dramatically concludes that the entire **“CST-Cama-Rangbhavan lane operation was scripted and executed jointly by the Brahminists… and their well-wishers in the IB with the sole objective of eliminating Hemant Karkare”* punemirror.com.

Circumstantial Anomalies: Mushrif cites several anomalies to support this theory:

Timing and Location Discrepancies: He notes that when gunfire was reported at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) around 10 pm, almost simultaneously shots were heard at Cama Hospital and nearby lane where Karkare was later found dead timesofindia.indiatimes.com. “How can the same people be at two different places at the same time?” he asks, suggesting that the ambush on the ATS officers was carried out by a different set of assailants than the CST shooters timesofindia.indiatimes.com. This implies a coordinated plan to divert resources and split the police response.
Language Clue: There were media reports (including statements by a senior government official) that the gunmen at Cama Hospital were overheard speaking Marathi – a local language unlikely to be known by the Pakistan-based terrorists timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Mushrif finds it “baffling” that Ajmal Kasab or his partner (from rural Pakistan) could bark orders in Marathi, whereas Marathi would be natural for local Maharashtrian extremists timesofindia.indiatimes.com. This, he argues, is a telling clue pointing to local involvement in the Cama encounter.
Ballistic and Forensic Gaps: The forensic outcome of Karkare’s shooting raised further questions. Mushrif emphasizes that the bullets recovered from Karkare’s body did not match the rifles of the captured terrorists, making it impossible to conclusively say that Kasab or his accomplice’s gun fired the fatal shots en.wikipedia.org. Indeed, during Kasab’s trial, even the court observed that “evidence is weak” regarding who exactly killed Karkare, and this ambiguity went largely unreported en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Additionally, Karkare’s bullet-resistant jacket mysteriously went missing from the evidence locker after the attacks, which has fueled suspicions of a cover-up (either of shoddy equipment or of the true circumstances of his death) en.wikipedia.org. Mushrif sees the missing jacket as more than mere negligence – possibly an attempt to eliminate evidence that could contradict the official story.
Lack of Backup and IB’s Role: The book questions why police reinforcements failed to reach Karkare, Kamte, and Salaskar in time, despite their calls for help as they pursued the gunmen. This concern was later echoed by Vinita Kamte (wife of Ashok Kamte) in her own book, which revealed that Karkare had repeatedly requested additional forces to block the terrorists’ escape route, to no avail en.wikipedia.org. Mushrif insinuates that key decisions during those critical moments were manipulated – potentially by IB officers present in the police control room – to leave Karkare’s team isolated. He alleges the IB “conducted a parallel clandestine operation when the LeT gunmen were running amok elsewhere in Mumbai”, effectively hijacking the scenario to ensure Karkare walked into an ambush timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. The Ram Pradhan Committee, which later inquired into the police response, delivered what Mushrif calls a “distorted and incomplete” report timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Mushrif believes the IB and even RAW (India’s external intelligence) refused to fully cooperate with that inquiry, thus concealing their own activities that night timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
Suspicious Personnel Changes: A central motive proposed for the conspiracy is the removal of Karkare from his post to derail sensitive investigations. Mushrif points out that within hours of Karkare’s death, the very officer he had replaced, K.P. Raghuvanshi (who earlier headed the ATS during the 2006 Malegaon probe), was back in charge of the ATS timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Mushrif characterizes Raghuvanshi as an IB-favored officer who was allegedly “hand-in-glove” with right-wing elements, and thus unlikely to earnestly pursue the Hindutva terror angle timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. This swift reappointment is cast as evidence of a pre-planned power play, wherein Karkare’s elimination “paved the way for” a more acquiescent ATS chief timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. In Mushrif’s narrative, the “Brahminist forces” in league with IB achieved their aim on 26/11 by getting rid of a troublesome investigator and protecting high-profile extremists from exposure timesofindia.indiatimes.com.

Mushrif acknowledges that his theory is explosive and departs from the officially documented version of 26/11. He defends it by asserting that he conducted a “systematic analysis” of all available evidence and media reports, which led him to this conclusion punemirror.com. He even addresses the fact that a similar suspicion had been voiced by others – notably A.R. Antulay (a former Union Minister) and Sudhir Sawant (ex-MP) – in the immediate aftermath of 26/11. Mushrif distinguishes his work from what he calls their “guesswork”, claiming that he has methodically marshaled facts to back up what was earlier only an intuition punemirror.com. The book ultimately calls for a fresh investigation into Karkare’s death and the 26/11 attack, suggesting that only a thorough, unbiased probe can uncover the truth of this alleged conspiracy punemirror.com punemirror.com.

Critique of Indian Media and Law Enforcement

S.M. Mushrif delivers a sharp critique of how Indian media and investigative agencies have handled terrorism cases, accusing them of bias and willful blindness. In his view, the Intelligence Bureau is the chief architect of a misleading public narrative, and the media as well as police forces often become unwitting (or willing) tools in this architecture hindustantimes.com indiatoday.in.

Role of the Intelligence Bureau (IB): The book portrays the IB as a shadowy, unaccountable agency that has “never been questioned or verified” by any external oversight hindustantimes.com. Mushrif argues that the IB’s pronouncements are taken as gospel in terror cases – for instance, when a blast occurs, IB sources quickly brief the press blaming some Muslim radical group, and this narrative sticks in the public mind hindustantimes.com. Meanwhile, evidence or leads pointing toward Hindutva extremists are downplayed or ignored at the IB’s behest. Mushrif flatly accuses the IB of collusion with RSS-linked militants, to the extent of “being hand-in-glove with right-wing extremists” hindustantimes.com. He believes the IB has repeatedly sabotaged fair investigations: by misdirecting police, suppressing intelligence on Hindu extremist plots, and even, as he alleges in Karkare’s case, orchestrating clandestine operations to achieve the extremists’ goals timesofindia.indiatimes.com timesofindia.indiatimes.com. The author emphasizes that this pattern persists regardless of which political party is in power, because the IB operates with continuity and secrecy beyond public scrutiny hindustantimes.com.

Police and Investigative Agencies: Mushrif is also critical of local police and other agencies that, in his view, “looked the other way” when confronted with evidence of Hindutva terrorism frontierweekly.com frontierweekly.com. He cites how investigations were mishandled or biased: for example, initial probes into incidents like Malegaon 2006 and Mecca Masjid rounded up Muslim suspects and even allegedly tortured them, while failing to follow obvious leads towards right-wing groups kafila.online kafila.online. Mushrif suggests that communal prejudice within the security apparatus may explain some of this – i.e. a reluctance to believe that members of the majority community could be terrorists, coupled with an eagerness to incriminate members of a minority. He labels officers like K.P. Raghuvanshi as “communal” and implies that such officials were preferred by the IB to ensure investigations “target the usual suspects” (Muslims) rather than uncover inconvenient truths indiatoday.in indiatoday.in. The book calls out instances where legitimate evidence was ignored: for instance, in the Nanded blast, despite clear proof of a terror plot by Hindu extremists, there was little sustained follow-up and minimal media outrage – a stark contrast to what happens when suspects are from Islamist outfits.

Media Critique: Mushrif’s relationship with the media is nuanced. On one hand, he relied on investigative journalism and news reports to build his case, acknowledging that certain “reputed national dailies” did publish facts that hinted at the real story indiatoday.in. On the other hand, he criticizes the overall media narrative on terrorism in India. He implies that the mainstream media by and large echoed the government line and failed to question discrepancies. For example, Mushrif points out that a critical observation by the 26/11 trial judge – about the uncertainty of who actually shot Karkare – was “buried by media”, receiving almost no attention en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. He also notes that stories uncomfortable for the dominant narrative, such as terrorists speaking Marathi during 26/11 or the existence of saffron terror modules, were either under-reported or quickly forgotten. In interviews, Mushrif has been blunt, saying if certain newspaper reports that contradict the official version are true, then they demand action; if they are false, then “those who wrote them should be prosecuted” – either way, implying that truth has been a casualty in the media discourse indiatoday.in. He accuses sections of the media of a selective approach to terrorism: quick to highlight Islamist militancy but reticent to investigate Hindutva networks with the same vigor, often due to pressure or fear of backlash kafila.online kafila.online.

In sum, Who Killed Karkare? portrays Indian law enforcement and media as being complicit (actively or passively) in constructing a one-sided story of terrorism. Mushrif calls for more courageous and honest policing and journalism that can expose the “real face of terrorism” – even when it implicates politically powerful groups. His critique essentially urges institutions to overcome institutional biases and to follow evidence objectively, whether it points to Muslim or Hindu perpetrators.

Notable Incidents Analysed in the Book

The book systematically examines a series of terror incidents from 2005 onwards, highlighting each as a case study of either misattribution or cover-up. Some of the important incidents analyzed include:

2006 Nanded Bomb Blast: As discussed, this accidental blast in a Hindu activist’s home is scrutinised to show a Hindutva plot to impersonate Islamic terrorists, punemirror.com. Mushrif uses it as a baseline example of saffron terror activity and the lacklustre investigation that followed.
Malegaon Blasts (2006 & 2008): Both attacks in Malegaon (a Muslim-majority town) are dissected. The 2006 blast occurred near a mosque during prayers, and the 2008 blasts (on September 29, 2008) targeted a Muslim congregation during Ramadan. Mushrif details how the initial blame on Islamist groups (such as SIMI) eventually unraveled when evidence pointed to a Hindu extremist network, especially in the 2008 case en.wikipedia.org. He emphasizes Karkare’s role in uncovering the truth, and how these cases exemplify the “politics of terror” that ensnared ATS officers in controversy kafila.online kafila.online.
Samjhauta Express Train Blast (2007): Mushrif likely delves into the cross-border ramifications of this bombing of a India-Pakistan peace train. He highlights initial theories of Pakistani or Islamist involvement versus later evidence against people like Naba Kumar Sarkar (Swami Aseemanand) and other Hindu radicals. The case is used to illustrate how Hindu extremist terror was able to operate across state lines, even targeting international targets, while agencies remained fixated on Islamist suspects.
Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad (2007): A bomb exploded in the historic Mecca Masjid during Friday prayers, killing devotees. Mushrif discusses how dozens of innocent Muslim youths were detained and allegedly coerced by police in the aftermath, only for the real culprits (connected to the same Hindu extremist circle) to come to light much later. This incident underscores his point about investigative bias and the human cost of false attribution.
Ajmer Sharif Dargah Blast (2007): The bombing at the Sufi shrine in Ajmer is another case study. Mushrif notes that while Islamist militant groups were suspected initially, eventually members of RSS-linked groups (like Devendra Gupta and Bhavesh Patel) were arrested and charged. The delayed acknowledgment of Hindutva involvement here serves as proof, in Mushrif’s eyes, of how deep the denial ran in the early narrative.
The 2008 Jaipur, Ahmedabad, and Delhi Blasts: Although these serial blasts (at Jaipur markets in May, Ahmedabad hospitals in July, and Delhi marketplaces in September 2008) were attributed to a group calling itself the “Indian Mujahideen”, Mushrif casts doubt on the official version. While he may not provide conclusive evidence of an alternative culprit, he questions the convenience of the narrative and the possibility of an IB role in facilitating such attacks to justify later crackdowns punemirror.com punemirror.com. (This is more speculative in the book, as these cases did not later yield clear evidence of Hindutva involvement; however, Mushrif’s general thesis suggests he believed even these could have been “allowed” to happen or at least manipulated by internal agencies.)
26/11 Mumbai Attacks (2008): The book devotes a significant section to the Mumbai attacks, especially the chase and shooting of Karkare’s squad as detailed above. Mushrif breaks down the timeline of the attacks, identifying the points at which he believes a domestic conspiracy intersected with the Pak-based assault team punemirror.com punemirror.com. This incident is the capstone of his analysis, tying together the threads of Hindutva terror networks and IB complicity in the most dramatic fashion.

By analyzing these incidents, Mushrif attempts to show a consistent pattern: almost every major terror attack attributed to “jihadists” in mainland India (outside of the Kashmir conflict and North-East insurgencies) had signs of an alternate story involving Hindutva extremists. He argues that once you connect the dots from Nanded to Malegaon to Samjhauta to 26/11, the outline of a pervasive conspiracy emerges – one that the public has rarely been allowed to see due to systematic obfuscation by influential agencies.

Impact and Reception of the Book

When Who Killed Karkare? was released in 2009, it generated intense controversy and a polarized response. Mainstream reception was wary and critical, while certain sections of society saw it as an important exposé.

Controversy and Media Reaction: The book was widely described as “controversial” in the press en.wikipedia.org. Major media outlets like The Times of India and India Today reported on Mushrif’s claims with skepticism, often characterizing them as conspiracy theories. For example, an India Today piece noted that Mushrif’s allegations were based largely on media reports and questioned the solidity of his evidence, suggesting the book would “stir a hornet’s nest” by peddling unverified theories indiatoday.in indiatoday.in. The families of the slain officers (Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte, Vijay Salaskar) also distanced themselves; Karkare’s widow, Kavita, diplomatically said she wouldn’t comment without reading it, and Vinita Kamte pointed out she couldn’t comment on a book “based on media reports” indiatoday.in indiatoday.in. Such reactions underscore that Mushrif’s conjectures were not endorsed by those closest to the tragedy, and indeed may have been seen as hurtful or outlandish by some. The Indian Express and other outlets ran pieces highlighting the lack of concrete evidence in Mushrif’s theory, implicitly cautioning readers to treat his conclusions with doubt.

Political and Public Response: The book found sympathetic audiences among certain political and social groups. Many in India’s Muslim community and secular activists viewed Mushrif’s work as an “eye-opener” that put on record what they long suspected – that investigations of terror attacks were often one-sided and that innocents from minority communities had been wrongfully accused. The publisher, Pharos Media (which often publishes works on minority issues), quickly sold multiple editions, and the book was said to be “selling like hot cakes” through non-mainstream channels kafila.online. However, it received relatively little coverage in the dominant media space (something Mushrif’s supporters decried as a “blackout” of inconvenient truth) kafila.online. In political circles, a few figures from the opposition questioned aspects of the 26/11 narrative. Notably, Congress party member Digvijay Singh and others referenced the possibility of a conspiracy in Karkare’s death (Digvijay even released a book by another author on similar lines), which sparked outrage from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Such endorsements were sporadic, though, and often met with fierce criticism. Earlier, in December 2008, the then-Minority Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay had hinted at a conspiracy in Karkare’s killing, causing a national uproar indiatoday.in. Mushrif’s book gave more fodder to that controversy a year later, but by then Antulay’s remarks had been officially disowned by his government, and the notion of any inside hand in 26/11 was publicly rejected.

Follow-ups and Continuing Debate: Who Killed Karkare? did spark a continuing, if niche, debate about “saffron terror” in India. In subsequent years, more evidence of Hindu extremist involvement in earlier blasts did come to light (especially with Swami Aseemanand’s 2010 confession), lending some credence to Mushrif’s broader claims that Hindutva terrorism was an important and under-recognized problem. Mushrif himself doubled down on his thesis in later publications and talks. He wrote another book titled “Brahminists Bombed, Muslims Hanged” and, in public forums, even called for the RSS to be banned as a terror outfit hindustantimes.com hindustantimes.com. He continued to assert IB’s culpability in various incidents and warned of rising right-wing extremism hindustantimes.com hindustantimes.com. His advocacy gained him a following among critics of the RSS, but also solidified his image (in the eyes of opponents) as a conspiracist.

Official Stance: The Indian government and courts have not accepted Mushrif’s theory on Karkare. In 2018, a decade after 26/11, the Bombay High Court dismissed a petition that sought a new probe into Karkare’s death, a petition influenced in part by Mushrif’s book and similar conjectures en.wikipedia.org. The court’s refusal to order a fresh investigation signaled that the establishment regarded the case as settled: Hemant Karkare was killed by the Pakistan-based terrorists, with no evidence of an inside conspiracy. To date, no credible official evidence has emerged to incriminate any IB officer or Hindutva group in the events of that night, and the sole surviving 26/11 gunman (Ajmal Kasab) was convicted for the murders of Karkare and the other officers, even though, as noted, some ambiguity in forensic evidence was acknowledged.

Legacy: Despite its controversial reception, Mushrif’s Who Killed Karkare? had a notable impact in shifting public discourse in some quarters. It was among the first books to comprehensively compile instances of “Hindutva terror” and question the role of agencies – coming months before the term “saffron terror” gained wider usage in Indian media in 2010 en.wikipedia.org. The book is frequently cited by those who argue that India must confront terrorism in all forms, including violence from right-wing Hindu extremists. It has also, conversely, been cited by critics as an example of a conspiracy-laden narrative that can undermine public trust in security agencies. To many defenders of India’s security forces, Mushrif’s claims were seen as far-fetched and even dangerous, as they appeared to exonerate Pakistan-backed terrorists and implicate Indian officers instead. This made Mushrif something of a polarizing figure – lauded by some as a whistleblower speaking truth to power, and dismissed by others as a biased or agenda-driven author.

In conclusion, Who Killed Karkare? stands as a bold and contentious work that challenged the prevailing narratives of terrorism in India. Mushrif’s main contentions – that Hindutva extremist terrorism has been underestimated, and that Hemant Karkare was killed as part of a conspiracy involving such extremists and rogue elements of the IB – remain unproven but persistently debated. The book’s meticulous compilation of anomalies and lesser-known cases forced a section of the public to reconsider the “real face of terrorism in India,” even as the broader establishment continues to reject Mushrif’s conclusions en.wikipedia.org. Ultimately, the book’s legacy is reflected in the ongoing dialogue about internal security and communalism in India: it reminds readers that terrorism is not associated with any one religion, and that vigilance is needed to ensure that investigations and media coverage remain unbiased and comprehensive punemirror.com punemirror.com.

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Hemant Karkare profile and 26/11 coverage – The Indian Express, DNA India, Economic Times (2008–2010) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org.
Kafila Online (Dec 17, 2010). “Villain in Life, Hero in Death: Hindutva’s new-found love for Hemant Karkare.” kafila.online kafila.online.
Frontier Weekly (2012). Review of Godse’s Children: Hindutva Terror in India (contextual reference to Mushrif’s work) frontierweekly.com frontierweekly.com.
Wikipedia – “Hemant Karkare” (for general reference on events and book publication) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org.

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