Jahangir Mohammed contends that too much time has been devoted to a government definition of anti-Muslim hostility and hate, which is hardly distinguishable from the College of Policing’s guidance on racial and religious hatred. He highlights that a UN definition of Islamophobia already exists and criticises the new government strategy for further entrenching the targeting of Islam and Muslims under the guise of addressing hate and promoting community cohesion.

PROTECTING ISRAEL, POLICING MUSLIMS: THE GOVERNMENT’S NEW STRATEGY TO INSTITUTIONALISE ISLAMOPHOBIA

The Labour government will finally reveal its anti-Muslim hatred strategy tomorrow. At first sight, it seems to show progress: a new definition around anti-Muslim hostility, the appointment of a dedicated “anti-Muslim hostility tsar,” and an £800 million cohesion fund. However, a leaked draft of the government’s “Social Cohesion Strategy” highlights a different approach. It is not a strategy to protect British Muslims but to further embed Islamophobia in state policies, creating a system where Muslims are monitored, censored, and penalised, in the name of promoting social cohesion and, most misleadingly, claiming to address antisemitism while censoring criticism of Israel and Zionism.

The Definition Distraction

After years of consultation, the government is finally ready to unveil its new non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility. The draft wording, reported by the BBC, is detailed but conduct-focused. It describes anti-Muslim hostility as engaging in or encouraging criminal acts, including violence, vandalism, harassment and intimidation directed at Muslims, as well as the prejudicial stereotyping and racialisation of Muslims to stir up hatred, and discrimination intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life.

This wording simply restates existing legislation. The Public Order Act 1986 already criminalises incitement to racial and religious hatred. The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice guidance already defines hate crimes as those motivated by hostility based on religion or race. Racial and religious discrimination are already unlawful under the Equality Act 2010. The new definition essentially states, in different language, what the law already prohibits. It is guidance that any capable Muslim organisation could have drafted for themselves in a matter of hours.

For years, Muslim activists and community leaders have taken part in working groups and debated semantics. The definition will not be legally binding. It will not change what police can prosecute. It does not give new powers to victims. It is gesture politics intended to show that “something is being done” while the real work remains neglected.

A Strategy of Structural Disparity

While Muslim organisations were discussing the definition, the government was busy designing a policy framework that made Muslim lives considerably more difficult. The leaked Social Cohesion Strategy reveals a clear institutional double standard.

The government already operates a standalone antisemitism strategy covering all departments and sectors of society, and it has appointed a dedicated antisemitism tsar. This strategy is regularly updated, even with the recent focus on anti-Muslim hate. The latest document now suggests an “anti-Muslim hostility tsar” linked to the Cohesion Strategy. Still, the tsar is just one part of a comprehensive 47-page strategy that also tackles the “normalisation” of antisemitism in schools, universities, workplaces, and the NHS. The message is clear: antisemitism is a serious issue needing special attention; anti-Muslim hatred is just one of many problems to be managed alongside others.

The Four Pillars of the Cohesion Strategy

The leaked document reveals four key areas of government action that will disproportionately target Muslim communities:

1. The “State of Extremism” Report: The strategy commits to producing an annual report on the “nature and scale of the current threat,” organised around specific ideologies including Islamism, the Extreme Right, and the Extreme Left. By equating Islamism—a political worldview based on Islam—with violent extremism and hate, the government officially endorses the conflation of religious identity with security threats. This creates a permanent category of suspects among politically engaged Muslims.
2. The “Cohesion Charter” for Universities:The Department for Education will co-design with students a Cohesion Charter to guide student conduct. Although ostensibly neutral, this responds directly to campus activism regarding Palestine. Muslim students protesting against Israeli military action can now be disciplined not for unlawful acts but for violating a “cohesion” principle, effectively criminalising support for Palestine as a threat to community relations. This will be enforced through increased Prevent duty monitoring and new powers for the Office for Students.
3. Charity Commission Crackdown: The strategy will enhance the Charity Commission’s powers to address “extremist abuse of charities,” including extending authority to suspend trustees and implementing automatic disqualification for those with hate crime convictions. Given the history of Muslim charities being investigated on flimsy reports related to Palestine aid and preaching, this poses a clear threat. It offers new, streamlined tools to target Muslim civil society under the guise of combating extremism.
4. Horizon-Scanning for “Extremist” Events: The Home Office will establish a dedicated “horizon-scanning function” to monitor extremist activities within local communities, including in hireable venues, outdoor spaces, charity organisations, and campuses such as student unions and non-affiliated student groups. This represents widespread surveillance of ordinary Muslim community events, from talks in hired halls to student study circles. The state is constructing an apparatus to observe Muslims wherever they gather.

Empowering the Accusers

This surveillance apparatus will be fed by, and will empower, the very groups who weaponise antisemitism allegations against Muslims. The strategy creates multiple new levers that can be pulled by those who view Muslim advocacy for Palestine and other causes or Islamic beliefs as a form of hatred.

The new campus reporting portal for whistleblowers, the strengthened Charity Commission complaints process, and the local cohesion risk assessment tool all establish formal channels for targeting Muslims. A pro-Israel organisation can now submit a complaint against a Muslim student society for hosting a speaker critical of Israel, prompting a review under the new Cohesion Charter or a Prevent assessment. A charity that discusses or prays for Palestine can be reported to the Charity Commission under its new, faster powers.

This is where the IHRA definition of antisemitism comes into play. With its 11 illustrative examples, seven of which focus specifically on criticism of Israel, the IHRA definition has been deliberately used as a weapon against Muslim and pro-Palestinian activists. Critics of Israeli government policy have been silenced and scrutinised, all under the guise of tackling antisemitism. The new approach equips those who have long weaponised the IHRA definition with a fresh set of tools.

The contrast is stark. One community receives a definition with 11 clauses (7 of which are Israel-related) that can shut down political opinion/speech. The other community gets years of consultation on a non-binding definition that is already operational, which explicitly protects the right to smear and target Islam. One form of “hatred” has a standalone antisemitism strategy enforced. The other gets folded into a “cohesion” strategy alongside the very people/groups who weaponise definitions against them.

Hypocrisy at the Heart of “Cohesion”

This approach becomes even more troubling when examined in relation to those who actually perpetrate anti-Muslim hatred. Some of the most vocal campaigners against “antisemitism” have also been architects of anti-Muslim prejudice/hostility. Organisations and individuals who invoke antisemitism to demand protection for Jews have simultaneously given a platform to Islamophobes, smeared British Muslims as a “fifth column” and as haters, and campaigned against Muslim community institutions. The “cohesion” framework allows this hypocrisy to thrive by pretending both hatreds exist in separate spheres, rather than recognising that fighting antisemitism while enabling Islamophobia is not fighting hate at all – it is picking sides.

The Work That Actually Matters

The opportunity cost of this definitional rabbit hole and surveillance architecture is immense. Every hour spent debating wording is an hour not spent training imams and community leaders to tackle anti-Muslim hate. Every consultation meeting with politicians is a meeting not held with Crown Prosecution Service lawyers/Police about why anti-Muslim cases are dropped.

The actual work of combating anti-Muslim hatred remains neglected, including:

• Ensuring police are properly trained to recognise and record Islamophobic hate crimes under existing laws, using the College of Policing’s established framework
• Funding local grassroots organisations that provide direct support to victims
• Challenging institutional discrimination in employment, the NHS and education
• Building Muslim civic and political power so communities can defend and advocate for themselves

None of this requires a new definition. It requires resources, political will and the empowerment of Muslim communities to use the laws that already exist. The £800 million for “left behind” communities is a distraction, a small sum offered in exchange for accepting a vast new infrastructure of state surveillance and silence.

A Definition Diversion While Institutionalising Islamophobia.

Anti-Muslim hatred is real and rising. The Home Office recorded a 19% increase in religious hate crimes targeting Muslims last year. Almost half of Muslim women feel unsafe on public transport. Mosques are regularly being targeted.

None of this will be stopped by a definition that falls short of the UN’s structural understanding of Islamophobia. None of this will be addressed by a tsar whose brief is shared with another form of hatred. None of this requires more consultation or carefully worded documents that require Muslims to tackle other forms of hate instead of focusing on their own.

The non-statutory definition is a decoy. While Muslim organisations spent years debating its wording, the government has been busy introducing policies that make their lives infinitely harder. The new strategy does not empower Muslims; it empowers the state to police them. It does not challenge anti-Muslim prejudice; it institutionalises it by equating Muslim political identity and activism with extremism.

The government has created a two-tier system of protection: dedicated support and strategy for Jews, and dedicated surveillance for Muslims. And in doing so, it has given the worst actors, who hide their Islamophobia behind a shield of fighting antisemitism, more tools to silence, sanction and intimidate.

The social cohesion strategy further institutionalises anti-Muslim hatred.  The United Nations has already given us a definition of Islamophobia. We need to stop wasting time with definitions and politicians and develop the institutional power to fight this hatred ourselves.